The authors examine competing theoretical arguments regarding whether union representation, shared governance, wage levels, and two features of the quality of labor relations-workplace culture and conflict in negotiations-lead to better or worse outcomes for airlines, and they test these interpretations using a mix of historical and quantitative data from major U.S. airlines. Both the qualitative and quantitative results suggest that relational factors-conflict and workplace culture-are more important determinants of performance than the structural factors of unionization, shared governance, and wages. The authors conclude that efforts to recover from the current crisis in the airline industry that depend primarily on reductions in wages or union power will at best bring only short-term relief from immediate financial pressures. Sustained improvement in service quality and financial performance will require more fundamental improvements in the quality of labor relations. 
customers and contributed to an already low and declining level of customer satisfaction, increased use of the Act's emergency procedures to avoid work stoppages, a pattern bargaining structure that more often paralyzed negotiations than pointed to acceptable settlements, and a deteriorating economy and market for airline travel.
Thus, it is not surprising that when the terrorist attacks led to a dramatic decline in air travel demand and confronted major airlines with billions in financial losses, the poor state of labor relations was seen as one of the key obstacles to the restructuring that appeared necessary. Some financial analysts and industry managers saw the postattack period as an opportunity to reign in the power and wages of airline labor (Barakat 2001) . And yet some airlines seem to perform quite well with unionized, wellcompensated employees, even in difficult times.
In addressing the industry's current and future labor relations, the question must be asked whether airline labor relations are a zero sum game or whether, instead, there are opportunities for mutual gains. Do reductions in union representation or wages improve outcomes for firms? Does shared governance improve outcomes for either party? Finally, what are the effects of reducing union-management conflict or strengthening workplace culture? While traditional adversarial relations continue to be the norm in the airline industry (Johnson 2001) , there has actually been important variation since deregulation both across firms and within firms over time on important dimensions of labor relations. This paper uses this historical firm-level variation to understand more clearly the relationship between labor relations and airline performance.
In the first section, we frame the competing arguments regarding whether structural elements of labor relations such as union representation, shared governance, and wages lead to better or worse outcomes for airlines. We then discuss how the underlying quality ofworkplace relations and unionmanagement negotiations may affect performance outcomes. In the second section, we contribute to answering these empirical questions by drawing on a mix of (1) qualitative profiles of airlines that illustrate the variation in labor relations strategies and practices over the past twenty years, and (2) quantitative data covering ten major airlines over the past 14 years. We conclude by using the insights gained from these combined quantitative and qualitative analyses to suggest steps the various parties might take to recover from the industry's current crisis and to begin a process of long-term performance improvement.
Labor Relations and Firm Performance: Competing
Theoretical Arguments
The Structure of Labor Relations
The nature of the relationship between firms and employees should be especially important in the airline industry, given its service-intensive nature, the relatively high ratio of labor costs to total costs, and the high level of union representation in the industry. Since labor costs account for roughly one-third of an airline's costs and unions represent approximately 40% of the overall air transport industry's employees and over 60% of the non-managerial employees of the major airlines (Johnson 2001; Hirsh and Macpherson 2000) , employees have the ability to affect airline performance in significant ways. Through collective bargaining, employees can achieve higher wages and employment security, leaving firms with higher costs and less operating flexibility. As in other industries, a union wage premium has been well documented in airlines (Cremieux 1996 ; Card 1998; Hirsch and Macpherson 2000). Furthermore, employees can impose additional costs in the process of setting those wages and employment conditions, through strikes or other service disruptions. Thus, employee gains in bargaining power and wages could be seen as necessarily detrimental to both service quality and financial performance.
However, at the same time, employees can also contribute positively to airline performance. For one thing, unions and the at Massachusetts Institute of Technology on November 23, 2015 ilr.sagepub.com Downloaded from wage premiums that they achieve put pressure on management to increase productivity through more efficient or effective use of labor or capital resources (Slichter, Healy, and Livernash 1960; Freeman and Medoff 1984). Furthermore, union representation, by providing employees with enhanced job security and bargaining power, may make employees more willing to exert discretionary effort. As in other service industries (Heskett, Sasser, and Schlesinger 1997; Loveman 1998), employees in airlines interact directly with customers, and therefore employees' motivation and satisfaction with their workplace are likely to have important effects on an airline's quality of service and resulting customer satisfaction (Gittell 2003) . Thus, while treating employees as costs to be minimized might be expected to lead to lower service quality and lower productivity, efforts to build a positive workplace culture by encouraging employee participation in problem-solving and teamwork might be expected to lead to higher service quality and higher productivity. Whether these hypothesized quality and productivity improvements made possible through union representation are large enough to offset the wage premium and thus increase firm profits is ultimately an empirical question.
One of the more interesting labor relations experiments in the airline industry has been shared governance, in which employees collectively own a large equity stake and are represented on the board of directors. Here, too, the effects on firm performance are an empirical question. On the one hand, increased employee influence in the firm's governance could be expected to lead to high labor costs stemming from some combination of higher wages, greater employment security and staffing levels, and more work rules. Some financial analysts complain that shared governance is merely a situation in which "the inmates are running the asylum" (Wong 2002 
The Quality of Labor Relations
The above discussion focused specifically on structural elements of labor relationsunion representation, shared governance, and wages--which together reflect the extent to which employees have formal bargaining power or a role in the governance structure. But some research on labor relations and firm performance suggests that it may not be the formal structure of the labor-management relationship per se, but the underlying quality of the relationship, that most strongly affects firm performance (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prenushi 1996; Gittell 2003). This view emphasizes the interconnections among three levels of activity in a labor relations system: the workplace, collective bargaining, and strategic decisionmaking. Building a workplace culture of high trust and implementing practices that involve employees in solving operational problems are expected to create a conducive climate for negotiating collective bargaining agreements expeditiously and with less need for detailed work rules (Katz, Kochan, and Gobeille 1983). The alternative of maintaining a more traditional adversarial relationship at the workplace risks setting in motion a self-perpetuating low-trust/high-conflict labor-management relationship both in day-to-day workplace relations and in contract negotiations. The evidence from other industries suggests that low trust and high conflict combine to have substantial negative effects on performance outcomes ( (Kochan 1980) . Union substitution strategies seek to reduce the motivation to join a union by providing wages, employment security, and working conditions equal to or better than those achieved in union settings in the hopes of balancing these higher costs against the higher productivity that might result from having more flexibility in organizing and reorganizing the production process. Union suppression strategies, as the label implies, involve fighting union representation efforts more directly by taking actions (legal or illegal) to defeat union organizing drives or to decertify existing unions in order to keep labor input costs low. The latter approach is likely to create or perpetuate a low-trust relationship at the workplace that avoids the overt conflicts that might occur in collective bargaining negotiations but fail to gain benefits from a highly motivated and committed work force.
Our analysis, then, seeks to contribute empirical evidence on the relationship between structural employee gains-union representation, shared governance, wages-and airline performance as well as on the combined effects of the structural and the non-structural factors on airline performance
Methods and Data
This study is part of a larger on-going study of the global airline industry at MIT sponsored by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Like other Sloan industry studies (Cohen 1998) , this project involves both a multi-disciplinary team of academics (in this case, engineers, economists, and employment/labor relations faculty) and active participation of industry, labor, and government practitioners and policy leaders. The active participation of these professionals provides access to data and interactions that would otherwise not be available through published sources or less sustained contacts and interactions. Therefore the qualitative and quantitative data for the analyses draw on a diverse range of sources and methods.
Historical profiles of the labor relations developments since deregulation in 1978 are drawn from an archival data base built from published information (news reports, company reports, research articles, and so on) and company and union documents. Union representation and union-management conflict variables are constructed from archival data maintained by AIRCon, and the dates of shared governance are determined from media reports.
Dependent Variables
Wages. Our wage measure is the sum of the wage and salary costs for all key operating personnel (flight personnel, maintenance personnel, and ground personnel), divided by the total number of employees in those key groups, using Form 41 data. The same wage measure is also used as an independent variable in our models, as we seek to understand the independent effects of wages, union representation, and shared governance on firm performance. Wages are log transformed in all models, in keeping with standard practice.
Service quality. Service quality is defined as the safety and reliability of the travel experience. Employees can influence service quality in this industry either through their direct interactions with customers or through the indirect impact of their actions on the customer experience (loading or failing to load a bag, adhering to or violating safety procedures, and so on). Safety is measured negatively as the number of pilot safety deviations per million departures, using FAA data. For ground personnel, we measure number of passengers enplaned per ground employee. Our final measure of labor productivity is an index of these six productivity measures, weighted according to the size of each employee group. Cronbach's alpha for this index is 0.84. Despite our craft-specific level of detail, these measures of output per employee are significantly affected not only by a carrier's route system and fleet composition (which we control for with average flight length and size), but also by staffing levels either mandated for safety purposes or negotiated in collectively bargained contracts. Thus, firm-level variations in labor productivity may reflect different staffing requirements more than differences in employee motivation and discretionary effort. Because of this, we also use a measure of aircraft productivity, as described below.
Aircraftproductivity. Aircraft productivity is computed as block hours per aircraft day, where block hours are the hours between pulling back from the airport gate and arrival at the down-line airport gate, using Form 41 data. These are the hours that an aircraft is considered to be in a revenueproducing mode. While this ratio does not include a measure of labor input, aircraft utilization can be strongly affected by the extent to which employees cooperate, coordinate, and exert discretionary effort in getting planes loaded and turned around quickly (Gittell 2001; Knez and Simester 2001).
Operating margin. Operating margin is measured as operating income divided by operating revenues, using Form 41 data. Return on assets was also considered, but was highly correlated with operating margin (0.96 correlation coefficient) and therefore is not included in the analysis.
Independent Variables
Union representation. The level of union representation in a given quarter at each airline is measured by the number of unionized pilots, flight attendants, maintenance personnel, dispatchers, ramp personnel, and customer service personnel, divided by total airline employment, based on archival data from the Airline Industrial Relations Conference. When there is a newly unionized workgroup during the study period, we measure union representation starting with the date the first contract is ratified, to account for the time lag between certification and contract completion. Shared governance. Shared governance is measured by a dummy variable equal to 1 in each quarter in which employees own equity and nominate at least one voting member of the board of directors of an airline, based on historical data.
Union-management conflict. We measure union-management conflict as the number of releases1 and strikes that occurred at a given airline in a given quarter, based on archival data from the Airline Industrial Relations Conference.
Workplace culture. Workplace culture is measured in a very rough way. Based on the airline profiles that will be discussed below, we created a dummy variable for workplace culture that is equal to 1 for Southwest Airlines throughout the sample period; for Continental Airlines starting in late 1994, to reflect the new culture introduced at that time; and for Delta Airlines up to the end of 1994, when a series of management initiatives discussed below undermined the strong culture that Delta was known for. Otherwise this variable is equal to 0.
Control Variables
To control for other firm-specific factors that may influence the dependentvariables, we include measures of capital intensity (capital assets per employee), average flight length (miles flown per flight departure), aircraft size (seats per aircraft),2 and employment growth (change over the past year in employment, divided by the number employed one year ago). All of these control variables are measured using Form 41 data. Finally, to account for factors that might affect the industry as a whole in certain time periods, we include dummy variables for each quarter in the sample.
Model Specification
All models tested here use airline-quarter as the unit of analysis. For testing these models, we use random effects regressions. Treating each airline as the random effect allows our coefficients to reflect variation both within and across airlines (Hausman 1978) . We also tested our models using fixed effects regressions in which coefficients reflect variation within airlines only. The fixed effects results are less efficient, because they discard information regarding differences across airlines. We there1Under the Railway Labor Act, the regulatory regime for airlines and railroad labor relations, the National Mediation Board grants a release after its members determine that no progress is being made in contract negotiations. A release signifies that the parties are released to self-help, including the ability to conduct a strike, after a 30-day cooling off period.
2"Seats per aircraft" is computed indirectly, using available data. If the number of passengers enplaned is 100, and the load factor (revenue passenger miles divided by available seat miles) is 80%, this suggests that seats per aircraft is 100/.80 = 125. With the exception of its pilots and dispatchers, Delta has remained non-union by following a union substitution strategy. Delta's historic approach to labor relations involved an implicit commitment to high wages, lifetime employment, and a "family" culture with the intention of avoiding union representation and eliciting high levels of service from its employees. For example, Delta's first unprofitable year came during the industry slump in 1982, but in that year Delta made good on its implicit no-layoffs promise and even gave employees an average raise of 8.5%. In return, employees jointly purchased a $30 million jet for the carrier as a token of appreciation (Financial Times 1982).
For a long time, this approach helped Delta maintain a reputation as a high-quality, high-service carrier. But in 1994, after four consecutive years of losses, the carrier broke its implicit guarantee when it laid off 15,000 employees and unilaterally cut wages. Not surprisingly, Delta's service levels quickly deteriorated, and its level of passenger complaints rose above the industry average, after having long been below average. The underlying relationship was clearly of some importance. As part of its return to financial health, Delta also strove to re-establish its good relationship. By 2002 it had significantly improved its service levels.
Frank Lorenzo's tenure at Continental, on the other hand, is a prime example of a union suppression strategy.
In 1981, Lorenzo acquired ailing Continental Airlines and demanded drastic wage cuts. When such concessions were not forthcoming from the unions, Continental filed for bankruptcy in 1983, abrogated its labor contracts, and offered its employees continued employment only at half of their previous wages. The unions responded by striking, but Continental restored operations quickly with replacement employees, and eventually broke the strike and withdrew recognition of the pilots' and mechanics' unions.
However, Continental's union suppression strategy did not produce sustained positive performance. While labor costs were vastly reduced, service quality declined precipitously, to the point that Continental experienced a passenger complaint rate consistently far above the industry average from 1983 through 1991. Furthermore, by 1991 it was back in bankruptcy. These cases suggest that the absence of unions per se does not cleanly predict good or bad performance. Rather, differences between the firms' strategies, which led to major differences in the quality of the relationship between labor and management, had a stronger effect on firm performance. Four of these five arrangements-those at Western, Eastern, Northwest, and TWAwere essentially a trade of wages for equity in order to stave off an impending bankruptcy. Even at United, while the airline was not facing dire financial straits, the ESOP was mostly a trade of equity for wage reductions to develop a competitive United Shuttle operation.
Thus, shared governance typically has not been initiated as a strategy for improving the performance of a healthy company or for achieving a cultural or operational transformation, but rather as a necessary evil, and it was viewed primarily as a financial deal.
Nevertheless, each of the ESOP companies experienced an initial burst of cooperation and improved labor relations. For example, within a year of the adoption of its ESOP, Eastern was being heralded as a national example of how employee involvement at the workplace, more cooperative labor relations, and employee voice in strategic decision-making could transform a failing company into one with a bright future (Petzinger 1996; Blasi and Gasaway 1995). At United, efforts to introduce interest-based negotiations and other labormanagement innovations occurred in the years immediately after the ESOP (Kochan 1999) .
But in all these cases, improvements in labor relations were short-lived, swamped by the mistrust that came back during subsequent contract negotiations. United and United, Eastern, Western, and Northwest all did experience improved financial results upon implementation of their ESOPs. Western, Eastern, and Northwest all staved off bankruptcy, and Western and Northwest even returned to positive profitability. United enjoyed substantial profitability from 1995 through 1999. However, these financial gains were largely the result of the wage concessions rather than improved productivity. United, for example, was no more profitable than its main competitors during this period, despite its significant wage reductions. In fact, the bulk of United's profit between 1994 and 1999 came from wage savings through the ESOP and regionaljet operations (Kochan 1999) . Given the failure to use these shared governance arrangements to transform other aspects of the labor-management relationship, it is not surprising that the financial gains from the wage reductions were shortlived.
The and Northwest were at the other end of the distribution (ranging between 20 and 22 months). Not surprisingly, these cross-firm variations in negotiation length are closely related to the probability of either a work disruption (strike, lockout, or slowdown) or the need for NMB intervention. Summary Our qualitative analysis seems to confirm the argument that variations in structural factors of labor relations are less determinative of firm performance than the quality of the underlying relationship. Having a low unionization rate can translate into superior or inferior performance, depending on the approach to union avoidance. Shared governance offered some initial gains that were, however, short-lived, as they were unsupported by improvements in the relationship. Carriers with positive workplace cultures and low levels of conflict in negotiations seemed to enjoy high performance.
In the next section, we test these relationships more systematically with quantitative data on ten firms over fourteen years. Specifically, we ask four questions: (1) Is variation in union representation associated with variation in service quality, productivity, and profits? (2) Are firm-level wage variations associated with firm-level variations in service quality, productivity, and profits? (3) Is shared governance associated with higher or lower service quality, productivity, and profits? (4) Are variations in the degree of conflict in labor negotiations or in the quality of the workplace culture associated with variations in service quality, productivity, or profits, and do they change the relationships between the structural factors and airline performance? As noted above, our productivity measures include both labor and aircraft productivity because both can be significantly affected by the extent to which employees cooperate, coordinate, and exert discretionary effort in getting planes loaded and turned around quickly (Gittell 2001; Knez and Simester 2001).
Quantitative Results
Means, standard deviations, and ranges are reported in Table 1 for each variable in our models, both for individual airlines and for the sample as a whole. Zero-order correlations are reported on Table 2 .
The Structure of Labor Relations
We first consider only the structure of labor relations and its impact on firm performance, without accounting for the impact of conflict and culture. Columns (la)-(5a) of Table 3 show estimated effects of the structural features of labor relations from equations that omit the non-structural features. We will see later that the results reported in this section change when conflict and culture are included in the model. Union representation. We find that union representation is positively associated with wages (p < 0.001) (column la). Union representation is also positively associated with aircraft productivity (p < 0.001) and operating margins (p < 0.05) (columns 3a and 5a). Union representation is not significantly associated-either positively or negatively-with service failure or labor productivity (columns 2a and 4a). These findings suggest that union representation produces higher wages for workers, and that it provides enough productivity improvement to offset the costs of these higher wages.
Shared governance. Shared governance is associated with reduced service failure (p < 0.001) and increased labor productivity (p < 0.001), though not with aircraft pro- ductivity (columns 2a-4a). Shared governance is also associated with lower wages (p < 0.001) (column la). This is consistent with the fact that shared governance is often offered as a quid pro quo for wage reductions that are seen as necessary for the firm's survival. Despite its positive effects on service quality and productivity and its negative impact on wages, however, shared governance does not appear to increase operating margins (column 5a). In our fixed effects model, we found that shared governance was positively associated with operating margins, suggesting that shared governance does increase operating margins within a given airline, but not relative to airlines that have not implemented shared governance. Wages. Wages are significantly associated with reduced service failure (p < 0.001) (column 2a). Wages are also significantly associated with increased labor productivity (p < 0.001), though not with aircraft productivity (columns 3a and 4a). The net impact of wages on profitability is neutral, suggesting that the quality and productivity gains associated with higher wages help to offset the costs of wages to the firm (column 5a).
Summary. Taken together, these results suggest that workers can gain from union representation and high wages without imposing costs on firms, due to positive effects on quality and productivity. The evidence also suggests that shared governance increases quality and productivity, though it reduces wages for workers. However, these results come from a model that we believe is under-specified.
We have considered only the performance effects of the structural features of labor relations, without accounting for the quality of labor relations. As we see below, our results change in important ways once we account for the quality of labor relations.
The Quality of Labor Relations
Here we discuss the effects of augmenting the structural variables discussed above with what are necessarily rather rough proxy measures for the quality of the labor-man- agement relationship-conflict and workplace culture (as described above, in the section "Independent Variables"). The effects of adding these variables are shown in columns (lb)-(5b) of Table 3 .
Union-management conflict. Union-management conflict is not significantly associated with wages, either positively or negatively (column ib). However, conflict is associated with increased service failure (p < 0.05), reduced aircraft productivity (p < 0.01), and reduced operating margins (p < 0.001) (columns 2b, 3b, 5b).
Workplace culture. Workplace culture is associated with higher wages (p < 0.001) (column ib). Furthermore, workplace culture is associated with reduced service failure (p < 0.05) and with increased aircraft productivity (p < 0.001), labor productivity (p < 0.001), and operating margins (p < 0.001) (columns 2b-5b). In our fixed effects models, where differences between firms were not taken into account, workplace culture was associated with wage gains and aircraft productivity but not with service quality or operating margins, and with lower rather than higher labor productivity. The differences in the fixed effects results suggest that culture change at Continental and Delta had some positive performance effects, but not as comprehensive as the performance effects associated with workplace culture at Southwest.
A Wald test shows that the conflict and workplace culture variables together make a significant contribution to the explanatory power of all our models: wages, aircraft productivity, labor productivity, and operating margins (p < 0.0001), as well as service quality (p = 0.0019). Thus, while these are only rough measures of conflict and workplace culture, they reinforce the qualitative evidence presented above. Gains from a high-trust workplace culture and a negotiations process that reaches agreements in a timely fashion without reliance on work disruptions or NMB procedures appear to accrue both to firms and to their employees.
Changed effects of structural elements. Once the quality of labor relations-conflict and workplace culture-is included in the model, the effects of our structural elements change in some interesting ways. Union representation continues to have a positive effect on wages (p < 0.001), aircraft productivity (p < 0.001), and operating margins (p < 0.05) (columns ib, 3b, 5b), again suggesting that union representation need not come at the expense of firm performance.
But although shared governance continues to be associated with reduced service failure (p < 0.001), its positive effects on labor productivity now turn negative, while its neutral effects on aircraft productivity and operating margins now appear to be significantly negative (p < 0.001). These results suggest that once we take account of the nature of the underlying relationship, shared governance itself has a net negative impact on profitability.5 In our fixed effects models, shared governance continued to show positive effects on aircraft and labor productivity, with neutral effects on operating margins, suggesting that shared governance has improved some results for individual carriers, but not relative to other carriers that have not adopted shared governance.
Similarly, once we account for conflict and workplace culture, wages no longer have consistently positive effects. Wages remain significantly associated with increased service quality. But the neutral effects of wages on aircraft productivity now appear to be negative, while the positive effects of wages on labor productivity also become negative. In addition, the net effects of wages on profitability become negative, suggesting that wage gains can come at the expense of profitability if they are not associated with sufficient reduction in conflict and improvements in workplace culture to counterbalance their costs. Our fixed effects models do not show these negative results of higher wages, and indeed show positive effects on labor productivity, suggesting that increasing wages can improve some results for individual carriers relative to their previous results, but not relative to other carriers that are on a lower wage trajectory.
Implications for Labor Relations and Performance
The results presented in this paper indicate that employee gains in labor relations do not necessarily lead to firm losses in the airline industry. In fact, firm performance seems to improve on certain dimensions in the presence of unions. Specifically, as expected, union representation levels are associated with higher wages. But union representation is also associated with higher aircraft productivity, presumably due to higher levels of cooperation and discretionary effort that enable aircraft to be turned around more quickly at the gate and to be otherwise more efficiently used. This productivity enhancement is apparently enough to offset the wage premium, given that union representation is associated with increased rather than reduced profitability.
Shared governance is associated with gains in service quality, aircraft and labor productivity, and operating margins; however, once we control for relationship quality, the positive associations disappear or even turn negative. Furthermore, shared governance is associated with lower, rather than higher, wages. Wages themselves are associated with reduced service failure and increased labor productivity; however, once we control for relationship quality, the association between wages and productivity, as well as wages and operating margins, becomes significantly negative. 5One could argue that shared governance reduces labor conflict and improves workplace culture, and in this way contributes to firm performance. However, this argument is not supported by the quantitative data; furthermore, our historical analysis suggested that shared governance by itself cannot be relied upon to reduce labor conflict and improve workplace culture. appears, therefore, that the overall wage structure in the industry may be lowered. Our analysis indicates that wage or employment cuts or efforts to reduce union power or representation alone may produce shortterm gains for the firms. But if this is all the firms do, or if it is done in a way that further reduces trust, the short-term gains may very well come at the expense of long-term recovery and health. Our results suggest that actions and policies that help build better labor-management relationships would make significant contributions to the longrun health of both individual carriers and the industry as a whole, even if the shortterm pressures make such actions and policies difficult.
Our findings suggest a number of constructive steps union leaders could take as well. To the extent that unions negotiate equity stakes in exchange for wage concessions, the lessons of the past shared governance experiences should be heeded. Any new shared governance arrangements should be combined with agreements on clear, explicit programs and principles to improve the union-management bargaining process and to foster better relationships in the workplace. Union-management initiatives to speed up the process of reaching labor agreements and avoid resort to work or service disruptions or NMB procedures are more likely to pay off if they are built on a basis of trust established during the term of the agreement.
Finally, suggestions can be made for government entities that are currently or may soon be involved in the industry's restructuring (for example, the Air Transportation Stabilization Board [ATSB], bankruptcy courts, Congress, and the White House). For example, the federal government responded quickly to the industry's request for emergency cash relief and authorized the ATSB to provide loan guarantees to firms willing to meet certain requirements. Making government assistance contingent on explicit business plans that include commitments for cost savings is a laudable idea. However, in light of our findings, it seems misguided to focus solely on wage cuts as the critical element of these business plans. This will likely perpetuate the industry's relationship problems, channeling firms into more short-term wage gains at the expense of long-term relationship building. Instead, the ATSB should be requiring not only credible plans for cost reduction and revenue improvement but also credible, actionable plans for programs and policies aimed at improving labor relations and the negotiations process. The same commitment should be required as part of any proposals for new shared governance arrangements as quid pro quos for wage reductions.
The airline industry's labor relations system was experiencing major strains before the attacks of September 11. The massive shock of those attacks confronts the industry with the need for major restructuring. This restructuring could possibly worsen the long-run quality of labor relations, and some actions seem to be taking us down that path already. But the restructuring could also be used as an opportunity to build stronger relationships and achieve mutual gains by those firms, unions, and public agencies that seek to learn the lessons of the industry's past.
